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150 Abstract
Poland’s marketable government debt has grown from essentially zero in the early 
1990s to USD 180 bn by 2019, with a wide range of maturities and security types. 
The aim of the article is to describe the long-term trends in the Polish sovereign 
local currency debt. Changes in its composition, maturity profile and ownership 
structure are analysed. The Ministry of Finance’s databases on bond transactions 
and secondary market activity are used. Since early 2000s the market has become 
less fragmented and the ownership structure has shifted considerably in reaction 
to global and national factors. Debt management strategy has stabilized the mar-
ket and reduced frictions. Countries developing their local currency bond markets 
should be encouraged to avoid market fragmentation and concentrate on selected 
benchmark issues. Creating a functioning local currency bond market is essential 
in avoiding the so called “original sin”, but must be part of a broader institutional 
push.
















2005;Prasad,RajanandZingales,2009).This isbecauseof theneed toavoid
whatiscalled“originalsin”,i.e.borrowinginforeigncurrencyandtheresulting
mismatchbetweenassetsandliabilitiesaswellasrevenuesandexpenditures(for
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Whilemost bondsoutstanding in theworld todayhaveperiodic,fixed coupon
payments,other typesofbondsarealsopopular (BIS,2017).Forzero-coupon
bonds, the repaymentof theprincipal is theonly futurecashflow towhich the
bondholder is entitled.Couponpaymentsoffloating-ratebonds (orfloaters in
financialmarketparlance)arelinkedtoabenchmarkshort-termrate(plusapre-




Bonds are usually divided intomaturity brackets: up to 1 year, 1-3 years, 4-6
years,7-10yearsandmorethan10years.Incontrasttothesituationindeveloped
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prospectus); the iShares JPMorganLocalCurrencyBondETFweights Polish
PLNdebtat5.03%.CurrentstructureofPolishpublicdebtispresentedintable1.
Table 1













Source: Own elaboration based on MoF data.
AsofDecember2019,MoF lists 33 separatePLN-denominatedbonds and42
bonds issued in fourdifferent foreigncurrencies (USD,EUR, JPY,CHF).The
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154 relativelylargeroleoffloating-ratedebtandthepaucityofinflation-linkednotes,




(26 different bonds, 74%of total value of FX bonds), exceeding the depth of
Poland’s JPY- (9 issues, 5%),USD- (6 issues, 21%)andCHF-denominated (1
issue,1%)bondmarkets.
4 THE LIFE CYCLE OF A POLISH BOND
ThePolishgovernmentbondmarket isorganized intobundlesknownasbond
issues differentiated by maturity and coupon. The overwhelming majority of






























in foreign currency debtmore often given additional risks, e.g. exchange rate


















































































































































Notes: The brackets in the horizontal axis denote the time when switching auctions are performed, 
i.e. [96-98) groups all instances when bonds were repurchased when at least 96%, but no more 
than 98% of their original maturity elapsed. 







Poland. Second, switching auctions typically occur late in a bond’s life – the
medianremainingtimeatrepurchaseofabondis7.5%ofitsoriginalmaturity
(i.e. 16weeks). Its distribution is negatively skewed, though, and repurchases
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156 Figure 2




















































Notes: The brackets in the horizontal axis denote the total share of bond issue’s nominal value 
repurchased on all switching when the bond was subject to repurchases, e.g. [50, 60) groups all 
instances when at least 50% of total nominal value, but no more than 60% was repurchased – 
conversely, for this group 40-50% of the bond’s nominal value was redeemed at maturity. 
Source: Own elaboration based on MoF data.
5 THE HISTORY OF THE POLISH BOND MARKET
Polandisahigh-incomecountry,butusuallyconsideredtobeanemergingmarket
































































































General government consolidated debt as percentage of GDP, historical data


























































































T-bill issues existed in the 1990s, the role of these instruments has steadily
declined.Apartfromashort-livedepisodein2016,thePolishMoFceasedtoissue
T-billsin2013.Second,in2000theMoFintroducedzero-couponbondsofOK






and thesecurity’smaturity time inMMYYformat. Inrecentmonths,MoFhas
issuedbondsoffiveseries:2-yearzero-couponOKseries,5-yearfixed-couponPS
series,10-yearfixed-couponDSseries,20-and30-yearfixed-couponWSseries


















































































































































Distribution of outstanding PLN-denominated debt by maturity (in %)






































Source: Own elaboration based on MoF data.
Figure 6
Number of outstanding PLN-denominated bond issues by maturity

































































































































Source: Own elaborations based on MoF data.
Thechangestoissuesizedistributionswere,onbalance,enhancingmarketliquid-







introductionof thenew (1997)constitution,whichbarred thegovernment from
borrowingfundsdirectlyfromthecentralbank.Hitherto,existingloanstotheMoF
(14%of total domestic debt)were, converted into bonds and gradually sold to
marketparticipants–by2003theNBP’sportfolioofPolishgovernmentbondswas
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161marketoperationshasalsochanged–intheearly1990sTreasurybillsweretheir
primary instrument (Przybylska-Kapuścińska, 2003). Since then, the ownership












































































































Source: Own elaborations based on MoF data.
From2013on,theamountofPLN-denominateddebtheldbynon-residentshas
ebbed andflowed but remained essentially flat in nominal terms.The pension
fundsreformof2013(whichcameintoforceinFebruary2014)cancelled,among
otherchanges,theprivatepensionfunds’entireportfolioofgovernmentbonds,
thereby bringing its share in public debt to zero andmechanically raising the
sharesofothertypesofinvestors.Themantleofbeingthebiggestnetbuyerof
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162 mustbeawardedtocommercialbanks,whoseholdingsrosefromPLN91bnin









of general government debt in Poland stood at 44.1% at end-2019, somewhat
belowtheEUaverageof49.3%.
Thechangesinnon-residents’shareareinextricablylinkedtotheoverallexternal
position of the Polish economy. The direction of causality is more debatable,
though.Between2006and2013Polandhasbeenrunningcurrentaccountdeficits
of4-6%ofGDP.Thefinancingofthosedeficitshaschangeddrastically,though.
In the run-up to theGlobal Financial Crisis and during the subsequent global
recessionthefinancialaccountwasdominatedbylargeFDI(3-4%ofGDP)and
other flows (4-8%ofGDP,mostly through cross-border banking).The former
sourcewascurtailedafter2008(to1.5-2.5%ofGDP)andthelattermostlydried
up.The slackwas takenby large-scaleportfolioflows intoPolishdebt,which
peakedat5%ofGDPin2010andstoodat3%ofGDPuntilend-2012.Since2014,


















theirmaturities and durations. The investment fund sector, having reduced its
portfoliomaturityin2013andearly2014,nowappearstoreplicatethematurity
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163longer-datedbondsbyhouseholds surged in2011andagain in2014,but their
holdingsremainsmallcomparedtoothermaintypesofPLNdebtholders.
Figure 9



















































































Notes: Average duration calculated only for fixed-rate and zero-coupon bonds of OK, PS, DS and 
WS series; average maturity was calculated for all PLN-denominated bond series.
Source: Own elaborations based on MoF data.
Finally,itisworthmentioningthattheoverallstabilityofnon-residents’holdingsof
















rency bondmarket – in away –matured in the past decade, there have been
importantshiftsinthestructureofdebtholdersthatdidnotimpacteitherthesup-
plyprofileorliquidity.Inparticular,recentyearssawthecompletedissolutionof
one largedebtholder (privatepension funds)and sharp increase in the roleof
another(localbanksandforeigninvestors–thelatterheterogeneousthemselves).
Buildinga liquidand large localcurrencybondmarket iscrucial fordeveloping
countries, as it allows them to escape the notorious “original sin” and therefore





















































































ized thisway isunknownat thisstageandrequires transactionandbondprice
databasestobecross-correlated.Finally,historyisstillbeingwrittenandatthe
timeofwriting,additional factorshavebeen influencing thefunctioningof the
market(i.e.COVID-19pandemic,significantissuanceofgovernment-guaranteed
off-balancedebtandunconventionalmonetarypolicieslaunchedbytheNational
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165marketwilloccurinthefutureastheseprocessescontinuetounfold.Finally,in
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